#Exploited in the Wild

Active Exploitation of LiteLLM Broken Access Control Exposes Secrets and Dashboard Controls

Attackers are actively targeting LiteLLM proxy deployments by leveraging an authorization bypass tracked as CVE-2026-35029. Prior to version 1.83.0, the administrative API failed to enforce sufficient privilege checks on the `/config/update` endpoint, permitting low-privileged, read-only accounts to make arbitrary configuration changes. Telemetry from Zenity Labs revealed approximately 3,900 requests targeting LiteLLM management endpoints across 73 distinct IP addresses between February and June 2026, with nearly 1,000 specifically probing the vulnerable update route. Initial exploitation attempts surfaced on April 7, mere hours after public disclosure. Threat actors leveraged write access to settings such as `UI_LOGO_PATH` to point the dashboard logo to sensitive server paths, including local `.env` files, configuration YAMLs, and `/proc/self/environ`. These local artifacts could then be fetched remotely without authentication via the `/get_image` endpoint. Beyond reading local files, an attacker could abuse LiteLLM's internal parsing of `os.environ/VARIABLE` directives or overwrite dashboard login environment settings directly. Altering these variables allowed adversaries to authenticate as full administrators on the UI. With full administrative access, adversaries could generate fresh API keys, manipulate underlying models, spin up new users, or dump downstream provider credentials and cloud access tokens. Observed malicious activity also included attempts to invoke `/user/new`, brute-force default master keys, delete models, and test unviable JavaScript prototype pollution payloads against the Python codebase. The vulnerability was resolved with the release of LiteLLM version 1.83.0.